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Abstract 
This paper examines the use of cultural memes on social 
media platforms as a tool for engaging Arab youth in Ara-
bic culture and a method of cultural transmission among 
youth. Engagement in the creation, publishing and promo-
tion of memes can be accomplished if the youth involved in 
the early stages of the creation process can be trained so 
that they become highly skilled at the task and at the 
same time are presented with challenges that match their 
skills, and have clear goals and measurable outcomes. The 
paper draws on flow theory’s premise that a state of total 
absorption, ‘flow’, can be attained in a game-like environ-
ment were the actors are highly skilled and the challenge 
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matches their skill set. By combining the viral properties 
of memes and their ability to transmit cultural content 
with the strength of engagement that a state of flow can 
create, the basis for a framework solution to engage youth 
in cultural content by creating memes in a collaborative 
game-like environment requires: (1) upskilling the youth 
involved in the creation of the memes; (2) consulting with 
local community elders and leaders in the initial storytel-
ling; and (3) designing a game-like environment as a multi
-phased competition that requires using the skills attained 
to perform difficult challenges and that promises rewards 
in the context of cultural stature and local and regional 




he initial optimism that swept the Arab world 
passed with the same speed it had arrived. It is 
now completely erased; the Arab Spring has 
turned into a long winter and the Arab world is 
in turmoil politically, economically and socially. As a re-
sult, Arabic identity is facing a crisis like never before and 
Arabic cultural content is taking a background role in the 
identity formation of Arab youth. The phenomenal rise of 
optimism around the Arab world and its equally phenome-
nal fall has created a sense of despair and doubt about 
identity. The future of what it means to be an Arab politi-
cally, ideologically, and more importantly, culturally, is 
now uncertain. This has hit young Arabs the hardest. Arab 
youth are often found on social media expressing confusion 
and frustration, asking the very important question of 
what does it mean to be an Arab amid all the chaos of 
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Daesh (ISIS), the failure of the Egyptian democratic proc-
ess, the war in Syria and the increasing sectarianism of 
the Arab world (Tarawnah, 2011).  
The last survey conducted by ASDA’A Burson-
Marsteller (2014) of 3,500 Arab youth between the ages of 
18 and 24 across 16 Arab countries found that Arab youth 
are losing faith in any positive outcome of the Arab Spring. 
Furthermore, young Arabs feel increasingly more positive 
about their own national government. Their sentiment is 
gradually shifting – in the aftermath of the Arab Spring – 
from that of positive pride in their Arabic identity to an 
inward-looking nationalistic view that relies on one’s na-
tional government and identifies with its local agenda, and 
whose primary concern is economic stability, not cultural 
identity. In effect, as the Arabic collective process fails, 
young people tend to look at the national narrative of eco-
nomic stability and their government’s ability to fight ter-
rorism as a natural response to the disappointment of the 
premise of an Arab awakening.  
 Since the Arab Spring there has been very little 
cultural content within the Arab media ecology, with the 
exception of music, poetry and art, that have preserved a 
pan-Arab narrative, as clearly demonstrated on pan-Arab 
TV shows like Arab Idol (Fuller, 2014), where contestants 
and judges often promote a united Arab world narrative. 
This narrative carries on in social media through the use 
of Arabic language music videos, poetry, movies and hu-
morous memes that include jokes and satire. Arab youth 
have managed to preserve a pan-Arab narrative only when 
it relates to entertainment content but not content of a po-
litical or cultural nature. This, on the one hand, shows 
that not all is lost, but it also demonstrates an urgent need 
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to re-engage young Arabs in their cultural identity. A 
meme that has both entertainment and cultural messages 
can be an effective way to reintroduce young Arabs to the 
discussion around what it means to be an Arab and to 
identify with being an Arab while distancing themselves 
from the political confusion engulfing the Arab world. 
Cultural memes serve a dual purpose for these youth of 
identifying their Arabism, while not having to deal with 
the political and ideological problems that come with being 
an Arab in the age of ISIS. The more these cultural memes 
become sophisticated, the more they become viral and are 
able to spread and infect more youth, and the more there 
is a likelihood that they can be effective in providing a 
counter ISIS narrative. Thus, cultural memes that have 
entertainment value have also the potential to elevate en-
gagement in politics, albeit indirectly. This level of ele-
vated engagement is likely to happen the more that cul-
tural memes are transmitted across the Arab world by in-
fluencer youth. And with this cultural transmission comes 
the possibility that these memes will morph and revert in 
such a way that would resonate strongly with the needs of 
these youth, and would generate the required level of en-
gagement such that any youth exposed to these cultural 
memes will feel a desire to pass them on to their social 
network.  
 This paper examines the changes in the media ecol-
ogy of Arab youth social media consumption from before 
the Arab Spring, during its peak period of euphoria and 
after its failure, in order to address Arab youths aspira-
tions for a future where a new, proud, Arab identity be-
comes possible by reinventing a cultural narrative that 
can be memed on social media platforms in a process of 
 Page 320                    The Journal of Social Media in Society 5(3) 
cultural transmission. The use of cultural memes, if they 
are enabled with the ability to generate engagement and 
connect Arab youth with a positive narrative of their his-
tory, culture and identity, is then able to create a contact 
zone (Pratt, 1991) in which a new collective media ecology 
will emerge that will be able to define a future Arab cul-
tural narrative that preserves these young people’s sense 
of belonging, regardless of the difficult political situation.  
The paper proposes that the initial creator of a meme 
must also be involved in the process of publishing and pro-
moting this meme in order for the meme to engage young 
people to an elevated state able to generate a forward mo-
mentum and secondary transmission. The process requires 
significant time and commitment on the part of the crea-
tor. This commitment can be accomplished if the creator 
attains a state of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Csikszent-
mihalyi’s flow theory states that when a state of flow is 
attained, an actor becomes totally absorbed in the process 
of creation, so that the final goal becomes less important 
and the process itself provides engagement (1975). Such 
that the person in that state is less aware of the self and 
totally absorbed in the task at hand. The state of flow re-
quires that the actor has good skills and that the chal-
lenges to achieve the goal are difficult but within one’s 
skill set. By combining a meme’s ability to transmit cul-
ture with the engagement produced when a state of flow is 
attained, we are able to engage youth in cultural content 
over social media. In order to do so, I propose that: (1) a 
process of training young people should include workshops 
for each phase so that they acquire the right skills re-
quired for each specific phase; (2) that the local elders and 
community leaders be involved in the process, especially at 
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the creation phase; and (3) that the program provides clear 
challenges with clear rewards in multiphase game-like en-
vironments.  
 
The Literature on Cultural Memes 
The concept of a cultural meme was first noted by bi-
ologist Richard Dawkins in his book, The Selfish Gene 
(1976). Dawkins used the term to describe ideas or behav-
iors that can spread from one person to another within a 
culture. Since then, the concept of memes as units of cul-
tural transmission has been adopted by sociology and phi-
losophy, with Douglas Hofstadter coining the term 
‘memetics’ by analogy with the biological equivalent of ge-
netics (1981). By the end of the twentieth century, memet-
ics was a term used regularly – if not without controversy 
– around what is the smallest unit that would constitute a 
meme (Brodie, 1996; Blackmore, 1999). The term has since 
been re-appropriated by the Internet to a more narrow 
definition of self-contained units of media that have cul-
tural values, and are able to spread virally via the Inter-
net from one person to many (Distin, 2005; Shifman, 2012; 
Shifman, 2013).  
As mentioned above, there has been a lot of debate 
over what constitutes a cultural meme, and what is the 
smallest unit of a cultural meme and is that unit a vehicle 
of content or the content itself (Atran, 2001; Dawkins, 
1982)? What resulted are two different approaches to me-
metics. These two differ on who is the boss: is it the actual 
idea expressed by the meme, or is it the vehicle carrying 
this meme? Susan Blackmore (1999) refers to people as 
meme machines operated by numerous memes who are 
helpless in the process. While Conte (2000) considers 
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memes as spreadable ideas and people as actors contribut-
ing to this spread. I adhere to the latter premise, as I con-
sider cultural transmission and cultural content only one 
part of the complex human-media interaction, where the 
totality is part of the new emerging media ecology 
(Postman, 2000). Regardless of how internalized or exter-
nalized memes are, and in relation to who is the transmit-
ter, what matters most is that memes operate from a mi-
cro level of personal transmission to a macro level of cul-
tural value adaptation. In addition to the embedded ability 
of memes to transmit cultural information, a successful 
meme is able to reproduce itself in multiple versions while 
preserving the ideology of its content (Thompson, 2012). 
This would be a powerful tool of cultural transmission, 
both utilizing the local context at the micro level and then 
expanding it by re-versioning to fit other locations – as 
part of the macro level.  
What makes memes powerful and of interest for the 
process of youth engagement is that they carry a cultural 
message, and this message, once memed, will have a life of 
its own that is capable of growing, mutating and infecting 
generations to come, thus carrying out the task of cultural 
preservation that was traditionally transmitted orally 
from generation to generation (Checkoway, 2011). The pro-
posed process is primarily digital and over social media, 
with the exception of the first phase of meme creation, in 
which the stories need to be first collected offline in consul-
tation with community elders. In fact, the older forms of 
oral storytelling: Hatota or Kharareef in the Arab world, 
were non-digital forms of cultural memes not too dissimi-
lar from the process of Internet memes. Only the platform 
changes to digital, which also changes the target audience 
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to young people. The new memes available on social media 
are mutations of these older memes. In this case the muta-
tion was caused by the introduction of a new medium or a 
new mechanism of infection. One can argue that the 
change of medium is a major shift that requires in-depth 
understanding of cultural transmission via social media, 
its pros, cons and implications for the final results. Even 
though there is a lot of research conducted on Internet 
memes, there has been no in depth explanation of the long
-term effect of such cultural transmission occurring on the 
new digital platforms. 
It is important to note here that while in biology high 
fidelity transmission is the norm, with Internet memes – 
especially memes with high cultural value – high fidelity 
transmission is the exception rather than the norm (Atran, 
2001). This can be problematic if we need to ensure a suc-
cessful spread of a cultural idea, thus it becomes impor-
tant not to rely entirely on Internet memes and vital that 
these memes operate within a media ecosystem capable of 
receiving and transmitting them efficiently so that we can 
minimize the low fidelity found cultural memes. Thus the 
environmental and cultural context in which these memes 
are created and then released becomes a very important 
factor in providing the right parameters for such cultural 
transmission to occur effectively (Atran, 2001; Sperber, 
1985). Even though cultural memes have low fidelity, it 
still holds true that they possess most of the characteris-
tics of other Internet memes in that they are easily repli-
cated, they carry a cultural value that can transfer from 
one person to another and are adaptable, and thus can 
also mutate and provide a second tier of transmission.  
Most Internet memes rely on humor, unexpectedness 
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or pure emotional value to make them go viral. Cultural 
memes often lack the element of light entertainment and 
have to resort to other methods in order to compensate for 
this deficiency. In most cases, the viral value of these cul-
tural memes can and does rely heavily on the creators’ 
stature in their local community and their online network 
once they publish it on social media. This is why the hu-
man factor becomes key to the success of cultural memes. 
In other words, we need to ensure that the initial trans-
mitters and creators of a cultural meme do so with such 
strong belief that it can be infectious within their immedi-
ate networks, and with such force and enthusiasm that 
gives it momentum to be further transmitted to a third 
tier, thus creating a snowball effect. In order to do this, we 
need to look at the concept of flow developed by Csíkszent-
mihalyi, "which is about creating a holistic experience that 
people feel when they act with total involve-
ment" (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, p. 36). This holistic experi-
ence and total absorption can only be achieved if the per-
son creating the meme has such an enjoyable experience 
that nothing else seems to matter: “The experience itself is 
so enjoyable that people will do it even at great cost, for 
the sheer sake of doing it” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 4). 
If we ensure that the initial phases of creating these cul-
tural memes take place in a game-like environment with 
high skills and high challenges, we can create optimal con-
ditions for flow to occur, ensuring that such a meme will 
have enough energy to go past the first tier transmitters 
(Asakawa, 2004).  
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) identified the following key 
factors, which, if present, will create a flow experience: (1) 
Intense concentration on the task at hand while still pre-
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serving awareness of the actions taken; (2) Loss of reflec-
tive self-consciousness; (3) The sense of total control over 
the actions and tasks undertaken; and (4) The process of 
undertaking the tasks will become as rewarding as the 
goals expected from completing that task. Once these ele-
ments are achieved, we can say that the person executing 
this action has attained flow. This flow can occur in a 
game-like environment if there are milestones of obstacles 
and rewards.  
In our proposed model, the creator of the cultural 
meme must first be trained offline through a deliberate 
process involving an incubation period and a final valida-
tion of skills. Once highly skilled, the creator is then given 
game-like tasks with milestones that include capturing the 
content, converting it into micro stories (digital memes), 
publishing it and finally promoting it to their social net-
works. This process will achieve a state of flow that is ca-
pable of creating viral transmission of the cultural meme. 
It is also important to understand the concept of low-
fidelity in the transmission of culture, which itself is a 
mechanism for cultural preservation. In order to preserve 
culture we need to transmit it, but it is equally important 
that transmission should be managed in such manner that 
ensures a transmission speed high enough to generate 
flow but low enough to preserve the cultural content from 
the danger of rapid mutation (Gergely & Csibra, 2006; 
Cavalli-Sforza, Feldman, Chen, & Dornbusch, 1982; Bisin 
& Verdier, 2001). Thus a delicate balance needs to be 
struck so that we ensure cultural transmission but at a 
rate that preserves the original meme from too much mu-
tation. 
Arabic society is a highly contextual culture where in-
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terpersonal contact is more important than the value of 
the message itself (Hall, 1976), which puts even more em-
phasis on the personal relationships among the elders, the 
meme creators and the audience. Community elders and 
leaders also ensure that the value of this transmission is 
such that it can relate to the cultural context. Thus, it is 
essential to understand the local context of the transmis-
sion of Arab cultural memes in relation to each Arab coun-
try, each region, city or even village because each locality 
is its own context. These variations have the potential to 
confuse but, if handled correctly, can add depth and a 
macro tapestry of cultural knowledge.  
One can argue that in spite of the variations within 
each local community, the power of the receiver in the in-
terpretation of a meme will have a direct influence on the 
nature and fidelity of the transmission of such a meme. 
Atran in his article The trouble with memes uses the ex-
ample of a group of marching Maoists, noting that:  
In the statement ‘Let a thousand flowers bloom,’ you 
can bet most marchers do not have the same flowers in 
mind, or any flowers at all, or even a medium fidelity 
version of what others have in mind. What the crowd 
has in common is a context, for example, a rally 
against ‘western influence’. The shared context mobi-
lizes background knowledge in people's minds. (Atran, 
2001, p. 365) 
In the case of the Arab world, identity becomes that 
important shared context necessary to preserve the origi-
nality of such variants across Arab locales. 
 
The Question of Arab Identity 
Arabic identity is defined both by language and geogra-
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phy. Although an overwhelming majority of Arabs are 
Muslims, there are still a sizable Christian minority that 
also identify as Arabs, in this case religion is not a defin-
ing factor of Arab identity. Many non-Arabic-speaking mi-
norities that are geographically located in the Arab world, 
might or might not identify with being an Arab depending 
on the context. In the pan-Arab TV show Arab Idol, con-
testants from Kurdish background who spoke and under-
stood very little Arabic, were announced by the host and 
judges as Arabs, with one of the judges even addressing 
one of the Kurdish contestants: ‘Welcome to Arab Idol, the 
program of all Arabs’, so in this case Arab nationalism in-
cluded non-Arabic-speaking Kurds (Fuller, 2014).  
Since the early days of Islam, there have always been 
two distinctive narratives, one closely tying Arab Nation-
alism to Islam, the other emphasizes that religion is not a 
defining factor in being an Arab; that is, being a Muslim, 
does not necessarily mean being an Arab, and vice versa, 
being an Arab does not imply being of the Muslim faith. 
Arab nationalism dates back to 1868, when Ibrahim Al-
yazigi, a Syrian Christian Arab philosopher, urged the Ar-
abs to recover their lost ancient vitality and rebel against 
the Turks (Maalouf, 2000; 2001; 2011). At the time, the 
Arab world had been subjected to 400 years of Ottoman 
occupation, which was deliberate in trying to erase Arab 
identity and replace it with a narrative of the Ottoman Is-
lamic empire, which was expansionist in its mandate. This 
meant that it needed total control of its subjects, system-
atically erasing their cultural identity. However, the Otto-
mans did not manage to erase the Arabic language, which 
remained the main spoken language with only minor 
modification in the form of a few Turkish expressions 
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(Maalouf, 1984). 
Arab nationalism was born slowly from a small begin-
ning with Al Yazigi and a small group of Arab elites who 
were both rebelling against the Ottoman Empire and try-
ing to sculpt an identity based on language and geography 
and not religion (Tamari, 2008). This movement reached 
its height with Abdel Al Nasser’s attempts to unify the 
Arab world and with the creation of a confederation be-
tween Egypt and Syria. Arab nationalism was fated to fail 
miserably with the repeated Arab defeats by Israel over 
three wars. Finally, with the death of Abed Al Nasser the 
United Arab experiment was totally abandoned. Two 
things remained festering in the background over the next 
50 years, and until the Arab Spring. First, the Baath 
Party in Syria, which clings to some remnant of Arab na-
tionalism by virtue of its secular mandate. Second, the 
Palestinian question, which had somehow united Arabs 
against a common enemy that had damaged their pride 
and, at the same time, occupied a very important symbol 
of their identity, Jerusalem. This desire to unite against a 
common enemy and restore Arab pride was constantly op-
pressed by two counter narratives. On one hand, the Arab 
regimes were eager to align with the United States of 
America as to preserve the narrative of Israel as the en-
emy. On the other hand, the rise of Islamic fundamental-
ism, which also tried to redefine the Palestinian question 
as an Islamic one, with some success. ‘Al Quds Al Arabyi’, 
Arabic Jerusalem became ‘Quds Al Islam’, Islam’s Jerusa-
lem. The tug of war between Arabic vs. Islamic identities, 
and western-backed regimes vs. underground Islamic 
movements vs. a small leftist, pan-Arab movement con-
tributed to the delicate equilibrium of the status quo. 
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In spite of the clear show of strength by Islamic parties 
and the apparent death of Arab nationalism, the early 
days of the Arab Spring and the few years preceding it 
showed a steady resurrection of Arab identity, even 
though this was short-lived after the Arab Spring, espe-
cially when it became clear that the Muslim brotherhood 
and other Islamic parties were the clear winners of the 
Arab Spring. Subsequently, the Arab Spring devolved into 
a chaotic sectarian war that spanned the Arab world and 
threatens to yet again put religion and, worse, sectarian-
ism as the key winner, while pushing the Arab identity 
agenda further into silence. This new development and the 
increased loss of faith in the Arab Spring has resulted in 
Arab youth being forced to abandon the Arabic cultural 
narrative and resort to their own country’s national narra-
tive, and, in some cases, western values (ASDA'A Burson-
Marsteller, 2014). 
The few pockets of resistance in the Arab world that 
call for the resurrection of Arab identity often try to associ-
ate it with Arab nationalism. In my opinion, this is a grave 
mistake that threatens to taint their message and attach 
it to previous failure. A more effective approach is to use 
cultural memes to connect the positive aspects of Arab cul-
tural heritage with a new modern twist that can resonate 
with youth. Thus we bypass the last 500 years of turmoil 
and introduce a new Arab identity narrative based on Ara-
bic culture, history and language. 
 
Arab Youth and Social Media 
In the early days of Social media, Arab youth were pri-
marily used the platform as a tool of communication to 
chat between friends, to announce social events and to 
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share humorous memes that were often just a direct re-
hashing of western memes. Over the five years of social 
media use before the Arab Spring, the content slowly 
changed to include original Arabic memes, albeit mainly 
non-political. A study on the use of Facebook in the Arab 
world prior to the Arab spring found that:  
The overwhelming presence of the above-mentioned 
applications did not manifest in actual Arab cultural 
and social presence. A closer look at the content of 
video applications contained by the sample profiles in-
dicated that foreign content made up 65 percent of ap-
plications. (Fauad, 2009, p. 96) 
A great deal of research discusses the role of social me-
dia in political engagement in general, and among youth 
in particular. While it is not yet clear how much this role 
leads to tangible results on the ground, most researchers 
agree that, indeed, social media play a positive role in par-
ticipatory political and civic engagement. This role is am-
plified among youth due to the high rate of social media 
consumption among this group (Loader, 2007; Bennett, 
2008; Xenos, Vromen, & Loader, 2014). Particular to the 
Arab world and in relation to youth’s engagement in the 
Arab Spring and in politics pre and post the Arab Spring, I 
would argue that before social media the Internet had 
been used as a tool of communication among activists, as 
well as to organize and spread particular messages of dis-
sent, but that this was limited to a hardcore group of activ-
ists (Dahdal, 2013; Loader & Mercea, 2011; Schlozman, 
Verba, & Brady, 2010). Furthermore, in the Arab world 
among Arab youth, the typical use of social media was 
mainly of a non-political nature. Nevertheless, this en-
gagement, especially with the added benefit of ease of use 
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and accessibility that social media brought to the table, 
had the effect of narrowing the digital divide and later 
proved important in creating the right environment for 
these same youth to politically engage when the time 
came. While some researchers argue that social media 
might be a distraction that will generate the opposite ef-
fect by keeping people busy (and guilt free) online and off 
the streets (Morozov, 2011; Gladwell & Shirky, 2011), 
most researchers agree that social media had been instru-
mental in providing a ripe environment in the years pre-
ceding the Arab Spring. It is clear that social media were 
used by activists as an effective tool to communicate and 
mobilize the online communities that were then utilized to 
mobilize the crowd, and more importantly, show the world 
what was happening as it unfolded (Shirky, 2008; Khan-
far, 2011; Abdulla, 2011). For example, when Egypt 
banned journalists from Tahreer Square, social media and 
net citizens were able to deliver powerful images, videos 
and messages that were then broadcast by traditional me-
dia (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011). Here it is important to 
note that social media power was not just used for commu-
nication, mobilization and news gathering – a more impor-
tant role that social media played in the events of the Arab 
Spring was already years in the making before the events 
in Tunisia and before January 25. 
The Internet was first introduced to the Arab world in 
Egypt in 1993. In those early days it was used by youth to 
communicate, especially using the then popular MSN chat, 
and PalTalk in North Africa, so when Facebook, MySpace 
and Hi5 became popular in the west, they also quickly be-
came popular among youth in the Arab world. Social me-
dia gradually became a content generator and a place for 
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youth to consume content. By 2005 blogging became an-
other prominent aspect of Internet use, as a natural pro-
gression from using the Internet as a communication tool 
to using it to distribute content, and as a forum to debate 
current social and political problems (Lim, 2012). Arab 
blogger and online activists started distributing political 
content and we saw the emergence of some coordinated 
civic campaigns. Kefaya, translated ‘Enough’, was one 
such campaign that used the Internet to create a commu-
nity. Thus we have the beginning of the use of the Inter-
net’s full range of communication, content and community 
– something later utilized by the newly developed social 
media platforms. Thus blogging was the first mode of 
online civic engagement, with prominent bloggers such as 
Wael Abbass daring to take on regimes (Abdulla, 2010).  
This pre-Arab Spring role of social media was key for 
two reasons: (1) for building online communities that dis-
cussed the dire political, economical and social situation in 
the Arab world; and (2) for creating a slow cultural revolu-
tion through the dissemination of cultural content over 
these social media platforms (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011). 
In addition, there were, if to a lesser degree, some key po-
litical events that were initiated on social media pre Arab 
Spring. One incident that clearly illustrates the use of so-
cial media in political activism before the the Arab Spring 
is that of Esraa Abdel Fattah, who formed a Facebook 
group called ‘April 6 Youth Movement’ in which she asked 
workers to simply stay at home and not go to work on 
April 6 as a form of civil action and solidarity of workers in 
the city al Mahala Al Kubra who planned to demonstrate 
on that same day. Esraa was able to garner 73,000 mem-
bers to her Facebook group, a great success in those early 
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days of social media activism in the Middle East in 2008 
(Abdulla, 2010). Another example of political activism 
prior to the Arab Spring is the ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ 
Facebook page, which was launched in 2010, six months 
before the Arab Spring and is often credited as a key factor 
in organizing Egyptian youth in the days before January 
25 (Howard & Hussain, 2011). The page had begun ini-
tially as a response to the brutal killing of a young citizen 
outside an Internet café in Alexandria by the then infa-
mous Egyptian internal security police. The page called for 
street action and for the two months following its launch 
managed to mobilize five silent demonstrations protesting 
the injustice and holding two pictures of Said: one of a 
young clean-shaven youth and the other of his badly bat-
tered face (Eltanhawy & Wiest, 2011; Lim, 2012). Thus 
social media use had, in fact, evolved as a prelude to the 
message that the Arab Spring carried, which is: “We dare 
to rebel from what is to what can be.” This message was 
only possible as a direct result of the cultural awareness 
created by pages like the Said page. It is therefore impor-
tant to note that the Arab Spring had in effect been build-
ing up for years before it broiled to the surface (Eltantawy 
& Wiest, 2011). 
When Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire on 17 De-
cember 2010, a wave of uprising took the Arab world and 
the rest of the world by surprise. But the seeds for such 
widespread revolt against the status quo would have not 
been unexpected by activists using digital media in the 
Arab world. The digital media and online readiness for the 
early spread of the Arab Spring was firmly in place many 
years before the December 2010 events (Mcquillan, 2011). 
The early days of euphoria that accompanied the Arab 
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Spring disappeared as quickly as they had occurred, with 
the failure on the part of youth to capitalize on this mo-
mentum. This provided the opportunity for the religious 
parties, who were reluctant to lead but happy to hijack the 
revolution (Howard & Hussain, 2011). This may be attrib-
uted to many factors, including external political pressure, 
but one cannot deny the apparent failure of the youth of 
the revolution to formulate a strong platform of post revo-
lution messages. In my opinion, this was primarily due to 
the lack of a unified cultural message that is able to ar-
ticulate a cultural identity that can directly embrace the 
values of a democratic Arabic world, and at the same time 
connects to the once strong Arab nationalist identity. Thus 
the youth revolutionists faced a dilemma: to embrace the 
revolution they needed to be progressive and at the same 
time anti-Western. This narrative would only resonate 
with a small group of hardcore activists; the rest would 
need a much stronger cultural message. Arab nationalism 
would have fit this narrative but was not utilized, and this 
missed opportunity was taken advantage of by many ex-
ternal powers and by local Islamic parties, which eventu-
ally led to an alienation and marginalization of these 
youth and took the Arab world into a period of instability 
that still persists at the date of writing this article and 
will do so for a long time. In the current period, any still 
active diehard youths that once were mobilized against 
regimes are finding themselves calling for these same re-
gimes as the lesser of two evils. But most activists went 
underground or abandoned activism altogether. 
It is important to note that there are a lot of memes on 
social media platforms that have been published by young 
people from the Arab world, but that most are of enter-
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tainment value in the form of local humor or direct trans-
lations of western humor. These memes originating in the 
Arab world tend to spring from either the micro level of 
local country-specific memes to the macro, either Arabic 
rehashing of western memes or of religious Islamic 
memes, thus bypassing the regional Arab cultural identity 
memes (Arab Memes on Facebook, 2015; Arab Meme on 
Instagram, 2015; Esposti, 2013; Le Arab Memes, 2015; 
York, 2012). This is why there is an urgent need to provide 
an outlet for youth to re-mobilize, by giving them hope for 
an alternative narrative that is based on their identifying 
with the Arabic language and culture. This is where a well
-devised cultural campaign is needed, that mobilizes youth 
to generate cultural memes with the aim of resurrecting 
an Arab narrative that can be post Arab Spring, and, more 
importantly, look to the future, to bring an unstable Arab 
world to a new phase of democratic stability and stronger 
Arab nationalism (Murphy, 2012). 
 
Collaborative Flow as a Tool for Engagement 
The picture above paints Arab youth as helpless, un-
motivated, escapist at best, and confused about their cul-
ture and Arab identity (Murphy, 2012; Khalaf & Khalaf, 
2012; Tarawnah, 2011; Herrera, 2009). This bleak picture 
should not be taken as a problem of character that results 
in lack of motivation for matters directly related to culture 
and identity but, rather, a result of a lack of viable options 
presented to these youth. It is possible to motivate youth 
everywhere, and the Arab world is no exception, if given 
the chance and if given a worthy challenge that is within 
their skill set and that has clear tangible and achievable 
goals. Flow theory is often used in reference to sports, mu-
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sic, painting, dance and any other creative activity where 
the actor is totally immersed in the activity so that the ex-
perience itself carries more reward that the accomplish-
ment of goals. Cultural activities might not be at face 
value as engaging to youth as a football game or dancing 
to their favorite tunes or even creating a painting, but cre-
ating cultural memes, if planned correctly, can achieve 
flow in the same way as any other creative activity 
(Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002; Csikszentmihalyi, 
2014). 
I propose that youth should be introduced to a game-
like learning environment were they can gain the neces-
sary skills to create cultural memes. Once they gain the 
required skills, they are then introduced to a second phase 
of this game-like environment in which they will create 
the meme. This will be followed by the two phases of dis-
tribution and promotion. This multi-phased game-like 
process can happen in a collaborative environment that 
not only engages youth individually, but as part of a com-
munity, thus achieving collaborative flow (Admiraal, 
Huizenga, Akkerman, & Ten Dam, 2011; Kaye, 2016; 
Pace, 2004; Sa, Teixeira, & Fernandes, 2007). Once young 
people are engaged and attain a state of flow, it is argued 
that the nature of the content, being of a cultural nature, 
will directly influence their identity formation. If and 
when Arab youth are presented with an opportunity to 
make an actual change (even if the goals are challenging), 
they will engage, as evidenced in the #youstink campaign 
in Lebanon that demonstrated a high level of frustration 
by youth united by a common goal (to get rid of corrupt 
politicians). This common goal has united Lebanese youth 
from all factions, demonstrating in the thousands in the 
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streets of Beirut carrying only the Lebanese flag, while 
leaving their respective sectarian flags at home, suppress-
ing their sectarian affiliations and united by the goal of 
overthrowing the government (#youstink Facebook Page, 
2012). It is important here to note that this campaign 
started on social media and then spread to the streets. 
Even though the campaign’s final goals are not well de-
fined, it has still managed to attract young people from all 
religious and political affiliations, some of whom have 
never engaged in activism before. Another example of 
youth engaging with online content are the non-sectarian 
demonstrations in Iraq demanding the arrest of ex-Prime 
Minister al Maliki. These demonstrations were also non-
secretion and nationalistic, with heavy participation 
online and in the streets (Al-Hasan, 2015). These two 
cases show that in fact youth are willing to engage if an 
opportunity is presented – even after the failure of the 
Arab Spring and the apparent helplessness of the Arab 
status quo (Staeheli & Nagel, 2013).  
So does this translate into engagement in Arab cul-
tural identity and would this translate into engagement 
with Arab cultural memes? I find that a comparison can-
not be made here because it is clear that the above move-
ments are nationalistic and not pan-Arab movements. 
Nevertheless, they do stem from frustration with the 
status quo and show that young people, if given the right 
goals, will act on them, if the environment is ripe for such 
engagement. The question of engagement in a greater pan-
Arab cause of reclaiming pride in Arab cultural identity 
requires a lot more that a goal to achieve this because this 
goal is too broad and cultural content is not as viral as 
purely humorous memes. What I am proposing to compen-
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sate for that is to: (1), train youth in creating these cul-
tural memes; (2) utilize the highly contextual cultural val-
ues in Arab communities by engaging community elders 
and leaders; and (3) ensure that the process is game-like, 
with high skills training followed by challenging tasks, so 
that these youth can achieve a state of flow. Once the cul-
tural memes are created and transmitted on social media, 
there remains the question of how much the state of flow 
will be embedded as part of the meme itself in order to 
generate cultural transmission from the local to the pan-
Arab and back to the local as a re-versioned meme. 
 
Conclusion 
The current political, economic and social situation in 
the Arab world is extremely unstable and consequently the 
environment in which Arab youth are living is increas-
ingly frustrating. As a result, when young people commu-
nicate over social media or seek content that can help 
them identify with their community and culture, they are 
presented with either foreign values or extreme ideological 
and religious values with very little if any cultural and 
identity forming content. This lack of cultural content 
leaves youth in a state of confusion about their cultural 
values, identity and geopolitical affiliations. The youth of 
today rely heavily on social media, and most of their inter-
actions with the outside world and the formation of their 
worldview occur online over social media. Currently, Ara-
bic language memes on social media are either pure enter-
tainment, nationalistic political propaganda, direct trans-
lations of western memes or religious messages that are 
often propagated by extremist groups with the intention of 
recruiting young people to their cause. Clearly, there is a 
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large gap in addressing the cultural identity of Arab 
youth, and this gap risks providing an opportunity for 
youth to either feel drawn to the extremist message or to 
look to western culture and values as the only viable alter-
native to the extremist message. Thus any chance of a pan
-Arab youth culture is lost in the muddle of the chaotic af-
termath of the Arab Spring. To counter this and to utilize 
the increased penetration of social media across the Arab 
world, we should aim to deliver meaningful cultural con-
tent that can help young Arab form their identity, so that 
in the future they can help build a more stable Arabic nar-
rative that is able to counter the extremist message. 
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